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Abstract
Eighty men, spread equally across 4 groups, were recruited, including men with and
without intellectual disabilities. The men were either criminal offenders or nonoffenders.
Participants completed measures of moral reasoning, empathy, and distorted cognitions.
The results indicated that the moral reasoning abilities of offenders with intellectual
disabilities were developmentally delayed but were still more mature than those of
nonoffenders with intellectual disabilities. Offenders without intellectual disabilities had
less mature moral reasoning abilities than nonoffenders without intellectual disabilities.
The differences may be partially accounted for by intellectual ability. The results also
indicated that the relationship between empathy and distorted cognitions was mediated by
moral reasoning. The findings have implications for the use of psychological interventions
with offenders with intellectual disabilities.
DOI: 10.1352/1944-7558-116.6.438
Piaget (1932) is often credited as the first
theorist to consider the moral development of
children from a psychological perspective. Later,
Kohlberg (1969, 1976) revised Piagetian theory and
extended the theory beyond childhood and into
adolescence and adulthood. However, Kohlberg’s
theory has been criticized for being culturally
biased (Simpson, 1974) and based on Western
liberalism (Schweder, 1982; Sullivan, 1977). Others
have noted that the theory appears based on
masculine conceptualizations of morality (Gilligan,
1982), whereas others have commented that the
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theory does not consider emotion (Sullivan, 1977).
More recently, Krebs and Denton (2005) have
argued that, in contrast to Kohlberg’s proposals,
moral reasoning is not structurally consistent across
all contexts. Some of these criticisms led Gibbs
(1979, 2003, 2010) to revise Kohlberg’s theory into a
sociomoral stage theory (Table 1). Other perspec-
tives have also been adopted, placing moral
development within the social (Semetana, 1999;
Turiel, 1983, 2002) or emotional (Eisenberg,
Reykowski, & Staub, 1989; Hoffman, 2000) do-
mains.
Although there are some differences among
these theoretical approaches, both Gibbs (1979,
2003, 2010) and Hoffman (2000) argued that
empathy is an important emotion that relates to
moral reasoning and behavior. However, Hoffman
(2000) considered empathy to be the primary
motivator of moral behavior and argued that this
relationship is affected by moral reasoning or
principles. Hoffman (2000) stated that ‘‘the
cognitive dimension…helps give structure and
stability to empathic affects, which should make
empathic affects less vulnerable to bias’’ (p. 216).
He suggested that moral principles are activated by
empathy, and empathy can become embedded
within or bonded with moral principles. In turn,
moral principles are augmented by empathic states
and, therefore, affect behavioral responses. He
further argued that this bonding leads to the
creation of ‘‘hot cognitions—cognitive representa-
tions charged with empathic affect thus giving
them motive force’’ (Hoffman, 2000, p. 239).
Gibbs (2003, 2010) also recognized that
empathy may motivate moral behavior, but it
may not be the primary motivator of moral
behavior. Gibbs (2003, 2010) considered Hoff-
man’s (2000) theory as one of ‘‘affective primacy,’’
and instead, argued for a model of coprimacy,
where both empathy and moral principles moti-
vate moral behavior. Nevertheless, both theories
of Gibbs and Hoffmann recognized that cogni-
tion and empathy may be augmented by each
other and that cognitions stem from moral
schema.
Unfortunately, the advances in moral devel-
opment theory have not explicitly considered
people with intellectual disabilities, and, in an
attempt to address this shortcoming, Langdon,
Clare, and Murphy (2010) undertook a structured
review of the literature regarding the moral
development of people with intellectual disabili-
ties. They concluded that the moral development
of children, adolescents, and adults with intellec-
tual disabilities tends to occur at a slower pace
than that of typically developing individuals.
These differences in the rate of development
may disappear when cognitive ability is con-
trolled. Langdon, Clare, et al. (2010) stressed that
their conclusions must be considered preliminary
Table 1. Gibbs’ Sociomoral Stage Theory (Gibbs, 2003, 2010)
Level and stage Description
Level 1: Immature
Stage 1: Unilateral and
physicalistic
Moral justifications are based on unilateral authority and rules,
or related to punitive consequences of the violation of rules.
Stage 2: Exchanging and
instrumental
Moral justifications based on an understanding that has arisen
from social interaction. For example, decisions to help others
may be justified because that person may help you in the
future. However, justifications remain superficial.
Level 2: Mature
Stage 3: Mutual and
prosocial
Moral justifications are characterized by further decentration,
and are based on a prosocial understanding of emotional
states (e.g., empathy), care, and good conduct.
Stage 4: Systemic and
standard
Further maturity is indexed by the development of an
understanding of the complex social structures in which
humans live. Justifications are also based on constructs such as
rights, values, and character within society. Other justifications
may be based on social justice and responsibility or conscience.
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because many of the existing studies made use of
measures of moral reasoning that were idiosyn-
cratic and unstandardized.
To address the issues highlighted by their
review, Langdon, Murphy, Clare, and Palmer
(2010) examined the psychometric properties of
two different moral reasoning measures. They
presented the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI;
Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999), a
recognition instrument, and the Socio-Moral
Reflection Measure—Short Form (SRM-SF;
Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), a production
instrument, to men with and without intellectual
disabilities of similar age and with no known
history of arrests, cautions, or convictions. They
reported that, for men with intellectual disabili-
ties, the 2-week test–retest reliability of the MTI
was poor, whereas it was good for the SRM-SF.
They also found that the moral reasoning abilities
of men with intellectual disabilities were less
developed than those of their counterparts
without intellectual disabilities and that the
differences could be partially accounted for by
intellectual ability. Nevertheless, even when IQ
was controlled, differences between the two
groups remained in relation to moral reasoning
about the law. The scores of men with intellectual
disabilities fell within a transition stage between
Stages 1 and 2 (Table 1).
In a subsequent article, Langdon, Clare, and
Murphy (2011) suggested that the relationship
between moral reasoning and illegal behavior may
be moderated by intellectual functioning and that
this relationship may approximate an inverted U-
curve. Based on these proposed relationships, the
moral reasoning of men with intellectual disabilities
and no history of engaging in illegal behavior
should be developmentally immature. Moral justi-
fications at the early stages are based on unilateral
authority or avoidance of punishment, and, there-
fore, such individuals should be less likely to engage
in illegal behavior. In contrast, as a group,
individuals with a history of engaging in illegal
behavior should be more likely to have borderline
intellectual functioning and more mature moral
reasoning, but this reasoning is still developmentally
immature and should fall within the stages associ-
ated with meeting one’s own needs.
There is considerable evidence that moral
reasoning is related to offending behavior among
young offenders (Blasi, 1980; Nelson, Smith, &
Dodd, 1990; Stams et al., 2006). From a
theoretical perspective, Gibbs (2003, 2010) has
argued that young offenders have immature moral
judgement, distorted cognitions, and social skills
deficits that interact and lead to illegal behavior.
Illegal behavior is then driven by cognitive
distortions that are generated by the development
of schema reflecting the individual’s moral stage.
This account has been elaborated on by Palmer
(2003a, b), who embedded moral reasoning within
a developmental theory incorporating parental
and peer influence, information processing, and
social and environmental factors. Like Gibbs,
Palmer proposed that immature moral reasoning
leads to the generation of cognitive distortions,
which are used by an individual to support his or
her illegal behavior. Palmer, thereby, provided a
theoretical link between moral reasoning theory
and illegal behavior.
Given the evidence of a relationship between
illegal behavior and immature moral reasoning
among young offenders, we undertook this study
to investigate the moral reasoning abilities of
offenders with and without intellectual disabili-
ties. The purpose of the study was twofold. First,
we examined the moral reasoning abilities of
offenders with and without intellectual disabilities
and compared these abilities to those of non-
offenders with and without intellectual disabili-
ties. We hypothesized that the moral reasoning
abilities of nonoffenders with intellectual disabil-
ities should be more limited than offenders with
intellectual disabilities. Among those without
intellectual disabilities, offenders should have
more immature moral reasoning than nonoffen-
ders. Second, based on the theoretical relation-
ships among moral reasoning, distorted cogni-
tions, and empathy (Gibbs, 2003, 2010; Hoffman,
2000), we examined whether the relationship
between empathy and distorted cognitions would
be mediated by moral reasoning.
Method
Participants
Eighty men were recruited from the east of
England (United Kingdom) and allocated to four
groups: (a) men with intellectual disabilities and
no self-reported known history of arrests, cau-
tions, or convictions (M IQ 5 58.8, SD 5 5.87;
M age 5 45.35 years, SD 5 16.57 years) formed
the intellectual disabilities group; (b) men with
intellectual disabilities and a documented history
of at least one Crown Court conviction that led to
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a custodial sentence (M IQ 5 62.9, SD 5 5.22; M
age 5 33.60 years, SD 5 7.54 years) formed the
intellectual disabilities–offenders group; (c) men
without intellectual disabilities with a document-
ed history of at least one Crown Court conviction
that led to a custodial sentence (M IQ 5 89.50,
SD 5 11.12; M age 5 38.80 years, SD 5
15.20 years) formed the comparison-offender
group; and (d) men without intellectual disabili-
ties with no known history of arrests, cautions, or
convictions as determined by self-report (M IQ 5
103.25, SD 5 5.77; M age 5 38.70, SD 5 12.99)
formed the comparison group.
The specific inclusion criteria were as follows:
(a) male sex, because there is some evidence that
men and women make moral judgments differ-
ently (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg et al., 1983, 1984;
Walker, 1995); (b) Full-Scale IQ score less than 70
for participants within the intellectual disabilities
and intellectual disabilities–offender groups, with
associated difficulties with adap tive behavior
(considered present if the person was receiving
support from specialist services for health and/or
social care) that had an onset before the age of
18 years (American Psychiatric Association, 2000),
(c) Full-Scale IQ score more than 70 in partici-
pants in the comparison and comparison–offender
groups; and (d) offenders having committed an
indictable offense that had been handled by a
Crown Court. Offenders who had tried by a
Crown Court were included because, in England,
these are used to deal with more severe offenses
(attracting a prison sentence of more than
6 months).
Design
A 2 (intellectual disabilities: with vs. without)
3 2 (offense: offended vs. not offended) between-
subjects design was used. Initially, all participants
completed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale—IIIU.K. (WAIS-IIIU.K.) to assess their gener-
al intellectual functioning. Participants then
completed the (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992), a
measure of moral reasoning; the Bryant Empathy
Index (BEI; Bryant, 1982), a measure of emotional
empathy; and, last, the How I Think Question-
naire (Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001), a
measure of distorted cognitions.
Measures
Offense data. Information about convictions
was initially sought from the research participant
directly and consent was obtained to verify
disclosures by referencing records. To account
for the difficulties with indexing convictions
simply by frequency, without taking severity into
account, offense data were ranked in terms of
severity by drawing on the findings of Francis,
Soothill, and Dittrich (2001), who used a paired-
comparisons method to devise an offense-seriousness
score. Similar methods have been used more
recently in the United States (Ramchand,
Macdonald, Haviland, & Morral, 2009). As a
consequence, offense data from participants
were assigned a severity score on the basis of
the data presented by Francis et al. (2001), and
the offense with the highest severity score for
each participant was ranked in ascending order
(higher ranks indicate greater severity).
General intellectual functioning. The WAIS-
IIIU.K. (Wechsler, 1998) was used to assess the
general intellectual functioning of participants.
This form of the WAIS-III is a well-developed,
reliable, and valid measure of general intelligence
that has been standardized on a British popula-
tion. Reliability coefficients for the WAIS- IIIU.K.
IQ Scales range from 0.88 to 0.97 (Tulskey, Zhu,
& Ledbetter, 1997). The WAIS- IIIU.K.yields three
different IQ scores; Verbal IQ, Performance IQ,
and Full-Scale IQ. Full-Scale IQ is an aggregate of
the Verbal and Performance IQ scores and
represents global intellectual functioning.
Moral reasoning. The SRM-SF is a production
measure of moral reasoning (Gibbs et al., 1992) and
has been shown to possess high levels of test–retest
reliability (r5 .88; Gibbs et al., 1992), and excellent
internal consistency (a 5 0.92; Gibbs et al., 1992).
Langdon et al. (Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, 2010;
Langdon, Murphy, Clare, & Palmer, 2010) demon-
strated that the SRM-SF has substantial internal
consistency and good test–retest reliability when
used with men with intellectual disabilities. The
SRM-SF is valid because it is positively correlated
with the Moral Judgement Interview and discrimi-
nates between children of differing chronological
ages, as well as between adolescents who are
‘‘delinquent’’ and those who are ‘‘nondelinquent’’
(Gibbs et al., 1992).
The SRM-SF comprises 11 questions and
generally takes about 20 min to present. The
questions relate to the following seven constructs:
(a) contract (Questions 1–3), (b) truth (Question
4), (c) affiliation (Questions 5–6), (d) life (Ques-
tions 7–8), (e) property (Question 9), (f) law
(Question 10), and (g) legal justice (Question 11).
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Each question is relatively brief and invites the
respondent first to consider the importance of
behaving in a certain manner, or making a certain
decision, within the context of a forced choice.
For example, when asked the question, ‘‘Think
about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of
yours. How important is it for people to keep
promises, if they can, to their friends?’’, the
respondent is asked to choose whether this is very
important, important, or not important. Next,
respondents are asked to consider further by
answering the following question, ‘‘Why is that
very important/important/not important?’’. Re-
spondents write their answers on the question-
naire, or give them orally to be recorded by the
interviewer. All answers from the participants with
intellectual disabilities were recorded by the
interviewer.
Verbatim answers are scored according to a
set of complex rules and heuristics, and the
development of proficient and reliable scoring
occurs through the use of practice scoring material
(Gibbs et al., 1992). Responses to each question
are assigned a developmental rating that corre-
sponds to a moral stage associated with Gibb’s
sociomoral reasoning theory. At least 7 of the 11
questions must be answered with scoreable
material for a questionnaire to be scored reliably.
After a developmental rating is assigned to each
question, it is converted to a number (e.g. a
developmental rating of 1 corresponds to Moral
Stage 1 and is assigned the value of 1). Scores
across all the questions are then summed, and the
mean is calculated and multiplied by 100, yielding
a possible score of 100 to 400. As shown in
Table 2, these scores correspond to a person’s
global moral stage. In addition, moral stage ratings
can be generated for each of the seven constructs
examined by the SRM-SF: The scores generated
across these constructs are interpreted using
Table 2. The interrater reliability of the scoring
of the SRM-SF was also calculated using an expert
rater (E. P.), who scored a random sample of 19%
(n 5 15) of completed questionnaires. Interrater
reliability was determined to be ri 5 .99 using an
intraclass correlation.
Empathy. The (BEI; Bryant, 1982) is a 22-item
measure of emotional empathy. The scale was
designed for use with children and adolescents to
measure emotional empathy in a trait-like man-
ner. Bryant demonstrated that the BEI had good
to excellent test–retest reliability and adequate to
substantial internal consistency. One of the
difficulties associated with measuring empathy
among people with and without intellectual
disabilities is that there is no measure of empathy
that can be satisfactorily used with both groups.
We considered the BEI a measure that might be
suitable because it is short and relatively easy to
understand and responses to items are coded as
simply yes or no. However, some of the items are
potentially inappropriate for use with adults, and
some minor modification to items was, therefore,
required. For example, some of the items make
reference to ‘‘boys’’ or ‘‘girls,’’ and these words
were replaced with ‘‘men’’ or ‘‘women.’’ Details of
the original items contained within the BEI, and
the revised items, are shown in Table 3. As a
consequence of these revisions, the internal
consistency and split-half reliability of the BEI
was calculated. The internal consistency of the
BEI was found to be k 5 0.64.
Cognitive distortions. The HIT Questionnaire
(Barriga et al., 2001) is a measure of cognitive
distortions based on the following four categories
proposed by Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs, 1991,
1993; Gibbs, Potter, & Goldstein, 1995): (a) Self-
Centered, (b) Blaming Others, (c) Minimizing–
Mislabeling, and (d) Assuming the Worst. The
HIT has 54 items, and respondents are asked to
indicate their degree of agreement along a 6-point
scale from agree strongly to disagree strongly. Total
and mean scores are derived for the four
categories of distorted thinking as well as four
Behavioral Referent subscales: (a) Opposition–
Defiance, (b) Physical Aggression, (c) Lying, and
(d) Stealing. An Anomalous Responding scale is
also calculated, along with three Summary Scales:
Table 2. The Relationship Between Scores on
the Sociomoral Reflection Measure—Short
Form (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992) and
Moral Stages
Score Moral stage
100–125 Stage 1
126–149 Transition Stage 1(2)
150–174 Transition Stage 2(1)
175–225 Stage 2
226–249 Transition Stage 2(3)
250–274 Transition Stage 3(2)
275–325 Stage 3
326–349 Transition Stage 3(4)
350–374 Transition Stage 4(3)
375–400 Stage 4
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(a) Overt Scale, (b) Covert Scale, and (c) Total
Score Scale. The Overt Scale is calculated from
the Opposition–Defiance and Physical Aggression
subscales, whereas the Covert Scale is calculated
from the Lying and Stealing subscales. The Total
Score is calculated from all subscales. Barriga et al.
(2001) reported that confirmatory factor analysis
supported the structure of the HIT. The internal
consistency of the HIT has been reported to range
from 0.63 to 0.96, and the measure has been
Table 3. Original Modified Items of the Bryant Empathy Index (Bryant, 1982)
Original items Modified items
1. It makes me sad to see a girl who can’t
find anyone to play with.a
1. It makes me sad to see an elderly woman
who has no one to talk to.
2. People who kiss and hug in public are silly. 2. People who kiss and hug in public are silly.
3. Boys who cry because they are happy are silly.a 3. Menwho cry because they are happy are silly.
4. I really like to watch people open presents,
even when I don’t get a present myself.
4. I really like to watch people open presents,
even when I don’t get a present myself.
5. Seeing a boy who is crying makes me
feel like crying.a
5. Seeing a man who is crying makes me
feel like crying.
6. I get upset when I see a girl being hurt. 6. I get upset when I see a girl being hurt.
7. Even when I don’t know why someone is
laughing, I laugh too.
7. Even when I don’t know why someone is
laughing, I laugh too.
8. Sometimes I cry when I watch TV. 8. Sometimes I cry when I watch TV.
9. Girls who cry because they are happy
are silly.a
9. Women who cry because they are happy
are silly.
10. It’s hard for me to see why someone else
gets upset.
10. It’s hard for me to see why someone else
gets upset.
11. I get upset when I see an animal being hurt. 11. I get upset when I see an animal being hurt.
12. It makes me sad to see a boy who can’t find
anyone to play with.a
12. It makes me sad to see an elderly man who
has no one to talk to.
13. Some songs make me feel so sad I feel
like crying.
13. Some songs make me feel so sad I feel like
crying.
14. I get upset when I see a boy being hurt. 14. I get upset when I see a boy being hurt.
15. Grown-ups sometimes cry even when they
have nothing to be sad about.a
15. Adults sometimes cry even when they have
nothing to be sad about.
16. It’s silly to treat dogs and cats as though
they have feelings like people.
16. It’s silly to treat dogs and cats as though
they have feelings like people.
17. I get mad when I see a classmate pretending
to need help from the teacher all the time.a
17. I get angry when I see someone
pretending they need help all the time.
18. Kids who have no friends probably
don’t want any.a
18. People who have no friends probably
don’t want any.
19. Seeing a girl who is crying makes me feel
like crying.a
19. Seeing a woman who is crying makes me
feel like crying.
20. I think it is funny that some people cry during
a sadmovie or while reading a sad book.
20. I think it is funny that some people cry during
a sad movie or while reading a sad book.
21. I am able to eat all my cookies even when
I see someone looking at me wanting one.a
21. I am able to eat all my biscuits even when I
see someone looking at me wanting one.
22. I don’t feel upset when I see a classmate
being punished by a teacher for not obeying
school rules.a
22. I don’t feel upset when I see someone
being punished for breaking the rules.
aItem has been modified.
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shown to possess convergent, divergent, and
discriminant validity (Barriga et al., 2001).
Procedure
Following the receipt of a favorable ethical
opinion from the Hertfordshire NHS Research
Ethics Committee, information about the study
was disseminated in different ways to participants
who were likely to have capacity to give or
withhold consent to participation.
For the intellectual disabilities group, manag-
ers of day services and community intellectual
disabilities teams were contacted directly and
informed of the project. They were asked to
distribute information leaflets to men with intel-
lectual disabilities using their services. They were
specifically directed not to share information
regarding the study with anyone using their service
who they knew to have a history of arrests,
cautions, or convictions. Any man who expressed
an interest in taking part was asked to alert his
keyworker, who then informed the relevant
manager. The manager then contacted the re-
searcher (P. E. L.) to inform him of the number of
possible participants at a site, and a mutually
convenient time was arranged to attend the site and
speak to potential participants. After someone
indicated that he might like to take part, full
information about the study was provided, and if
he wished to take part, written consent was sought.
The intellectual disabilities–offender group
was recruited by contacting medium–secure
hospitals in the east of England and gaining
permission to share information about the study
with potential participants who were known to
have intellectual disabilities and a history of
criminal offending. All men were detained in
hospital under the Mental Health Act 2003
(amended in 2007). Any men who expressed an
interest in taking part were asked to inform a
member of staff, who contacted the researcher.
The researcher than met with the potential
participant and additional information about the
study was provided, and again, written consent
was sought.
The comparison-offender group was recruited
through the National Probation Service. Informa-
tion about the study was shared with Probation
Services, who passed information to individuals
who met the inclusion criteria. Any potential
participants who expressed an interest in taking
part were advised to share this information with a
member of staff, who then contacted the
researcher. The researcher than met with the
potential participant and additional information
about the study was provided. Participants who
wished to take part were asked to provide written
consent.
Last, information about the study was dis-
seminated to the comparison group in several
ways. Information sheets were distributed by their
managers to men employed within a university in
a nonacademic position. Information about the
study was also disseminated using an advertise-
ment email system at this university. Participants
were asked not to volunteer for the study if they
had a history of arrests, cautions, or convictions.
Interested participants were invited to contact the
researcher directly, and written consent was given
by those who wished to take part.
No participant was included if he appeared to
lack capacity to take part or withheld consent.
Participants in all of the four groups were given
£10.00 (approximately $15.00 U.S.) in shopping
vouchers as a token of appreciation.
Data Preparation and Analysis
All data were entered into a database and
analysed using PASW Statistics Version 18.0.2
(IBM, 2009). Descriptive data were generated and
examined, and any errors were checked and
corrected as appropriate. Data were inspected for
departures from normality by visual inspection of
histograms and the generation of P-P plots. No
variables departed substantially from normality,
with the exception of the seven constructs
assessed using the SRM-SF; however, the overall
SRM-SF score was not affected. As a consequence
of the nonnormal data, we made use of boot-
strapping with 5,000 samples with replacement,
within analysis of variance (ANOVA) and analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA), using appropriate post
hoc testing. Parameter estimates for each model
were determined, and bias-corrected-and-acceler-
ated (BCa) confidence intervals were calculated.
The F statistic reported in the Results section was
derived using the original data, whereas the
significance level and the 95% BCa confidence
interval were derived using bootstrapping. If the
BCa confidence interval does not include zero,
differences are considered to be statistically
significant at p , .05.
To examine the relationships among moral
reasoning, empathy, and distorted cognitions, we
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followed the recommendations of Baron and Kenny
(1986) for investigating mediation, but we also uses
appropriate methods for investigating mediation in
small samples. Hayes (2009) argued that boot-
strapping procedures are more appropriate than
parametric statistics for investigating the indirect
effect within mediation models because assump-
tions regarding normality are not necessary and
these methods are more powerful. As a conse-
quence, we made use of the methods and macros
described by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for
investigating mediation models using bootstrap-
ping. For each of the two simple mediation models
we examined, we generated 5,000 bootstrap samples.
BCa confidence intervals were calculated and
reported here to examine the significance of the
indirect effect within each model.
Results
Descriptive Data
In relation to age, the initial analysis revealed
that there was no significant main effect of
intellectual disabilities, F(1, 79) # 1.00, p 5
.589, BCa 95% CI 5 23.40–1.93, or offense, F(1,
79) 5 3.20, p 5 .079, BCa 95% CI 5 25.22–0.21,
but the interaction was significant, F(1, 79) 5
5.83, p 5 .018, BCa 95% CI 5 0.61–5.94
(Table 4). Post hoc testing revealed that the
intellectual disabilities group was significantly
older than both the intellectual disabilities–
offender group (p 5 .007, BCa 95% CI 5 4.26–
19.24) and the comparison group (p 5 .049, BCa
95% CI 5 0.25–16.17), whereas there were no
significant differences between the other groups
(p . .05).
There was no significant difference in offense
severity between the intellectual disabilities–of-
fender and the comparison–offender groups (z 5
20.22, p 5 .83). For intellectual functioning, as
expected, those with intellectual disabilities scored
significantly lower on the WAIS- IIIU.K. than
those without, F(1, 79) 5 461.60, p , .001, BCa
95% CI 5 16.17–19.37. Offenders also scored
significantly lower than nonoffenders, F(1, 79) 5
8.52, p 5 .006, BCa 95% CI 5 24.07 to 20.76.
There was a significant interaction between the
intellectual disabilities factor and offense, F(1, 79)
5 29.14, p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5 26.12 to
22.77. Post hoc analysis revealed a significant
difference among all the groups (p , .05;
Table 4).
Empathy and Distorted Cognitions
For empathy, participants with intellectual
disabilities scored significantly lower on the BEI
than those without, F(1, 79) 5 12.00, p 5 .002;
BCa 95% CI 5 0.51–1.82, whereas neither the
difference between offenders and nonoffenders,
F(1, 79) # 1.00, p 5 .88, BCa 95% CI 5 20.71–
0.61, nor the interaction, F(1, 79) 5 2.17, p 5
.145, BCa 95% CI 5 20.18–1.18, was significant.
However, post hoc analysis indicated that the
intellectual disabilities group scored significantly
lower (p 5 .013, BCa 95% CI 5 23.22 to 20.57)
than the comparison-offender group. The intel-
lectual disabilities–offender group also scored
significantly lower than both the comparison-
offender group (p 5 .002, BCa 95% CI 5 25.31
to 21.45) and the comparison group (p 5 .023,
BCa 95% CI 5 24.43 to 20.36). Differences
between the other groups were not significant
(p . .05; Table 4).
On the HIT, the measure of distorted
cognitions, there was no significant main effect
for intellectual disabilities with respect to the
Anomalous Responding, F(1, 79) 5 3.81, p 5 .06,
BCa 95% CI 5 20.01–0.41; Self-Centered, F(1,
79) 5 1.68, p 5 .19, BCa 95% CI 5 20.28–0.06;
or Lying, F(1, 79) # 1.00, p 5 .375, BCa 95% CI
5 20.25–0.09, subscales; and the Covert Scale,
F(1, 79) 5 3.48, p 5 .065, BCa 95% CI 5 20.29–
0.01 (Table 4). However, men with intellectual
disabilities scored significantly higher than men
without intellectual disabilities on the Blaming
Others, F(1, 79) 5 17.16, p , .001, BCa 95% CI
5 20.51 to 20.19; Minimizing–Mislabeling, F(1,
79) 5 4.15, p 5 .046, BCa 95% CI 5 20.32 to
20.01; Assuming the Worst, F(1, 79) 5 6.07, p 5
.019; BCa 95% CI 5 20.39 to 20.05; Opposi-
tion–Defiance, F(1, 79) 5 13.12, p 5 .001, BCa
95% CI 5 20.51 to 20.15), Physical Aggression,
F(1, 79) 5 4.15, p 5 .048, BCa 95% CI 5 20.35
to 20.01; and Stealing, F(1, 79) 5 5.94, p 5 .021,
BCa 95% CI 5 20.36 to 20.04, subscales; as well
as the Overt, F(1, 79) 5 9.54, p 5 .004, BCa 95%
CI 5 20.41 to 20.10, and HIT Total, F(1, 79) 5
7.30, p 5 .011, BCa 95% CI 5 20.35 to 20.05,
Scales.
There were no significant differences between
the offenders and nonoffenders on the Anoma-
lous Responding, F(1, 79) # 1.00, p 5 .602, BCa
95% CI 5 20.15–0.26, and Physical Aggression
subscales, F(1, 79) 5 2.14, p 5 .146, BCa 95%
CI 5 20.04–0.30. However, offenders scored
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significantly higher on the Self-Centered, F(1, 79)
5 5.92, p 5 .017, BCa 95% CI 5 0.05–0.38);
Blaming Others, F(1, 79) 5 13.39, p , .001, BCa
95% CI 5 0.13–0.47); Minimizing–Mislabeling,
F(1, 79) 5 3.24, p 5 .016, BCa 95% CI 5 0.04–
0.36; Assuming the Worst, F(1, 79) 5 5.30, p 5
.025, BCa 95% CI 5 0.04–0.37; Opposition–
Defiance, F(1, 79)5 15.88, p , .001, BCa 95% CI
5 0.18–0.53; Lying, F(1, 79) 5 10.27, p 5 .04,
BCa 95% CI 5 0.11–0.44; and Stealing, F(1, 79)
5 5.29, p 5 .028, BCa 95% CI 5 0.03–0.35)
subscales; and the Overt, F(1, 79) 5 9.16, p 5
.003, BCa 95% CI 5 0.09–0.40; Covert, F(1, 79)
5 8.91, p 5 .004, BCa 95% CI 5 0.08–0.38; and
HIT Total, F(1, 79)5 9.68, p 5 .003, BCa 95% CI
5 0.08–0.38, Scales (Table 4). None of the
interactions between the intellectual disabilities
and offense factors were significant, and, as a
consequence, post hoc analyses of the subscales
are not reported here (but they can be found in
Table 4).
However, post hoc analyses of the Total scales
on the HIT indicated that the intellectual disabil-
ities group scored significantly lower than the
intellectual disabilities–offender group on the
Covert (p 5 .014, BCa 95% CI 5 21.08 to
20.14), and Total HIT Scales (p 5 .034, BCa 95%
CI 5 20.95 to 20.02). The intellectual disabilities
group scored significantly higher than the compar-
ison group on the Overt (p5 .002, BCa 95% CI5
0.22–0.88) and Total HIT (p 5 .029, BCa 95% CI
5 0.04–0.71) Scales. There were no differences
between the intellectual disabilities group and the
comparison-offenders group on the Overt, Covert,
or Total HIT Scales (p . .05). The intellectual
disabilities–offender group and the comparison-
offender group did not differ significantly on the
Covert, Overt or Total HIT Scales (p . .05),
whereas the intellectual disabilities–offender group
scored significantly higher than the comparison
group on the Overt (p , 0.001, BCa 95% CI 5
0.53–1.46), Covert (p5 .003, BCa 95% CI5 0.26–
1.20), and Total HIT (p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5
0.45–1.30) Scales. The comparison-offenders group
scored significantly higher than the comparison
group on the Overt (p5 .015, BCa 95%CI5 0.14–
0.95), and Total HIT Scales (p5 .033, BCa 95% CI
5 0.05–0.81; Table 4).
Moral Reasoning
On the SRM-SF, the measure of moral
reasoning, those with intellectual disabilities
scored significantly lower than those without
intellectual disabilities on Contract, F(1, 79) 5
120.95, p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5 40.57–58.34;
Truth, F(1, 77) 5 102.89, p , .001, BCa 95% CI
5 51.56–75.89; Affiliation, F(1, 79) 5 53.79, p ,
.001, BCa 95% CI 5 30.41–52.26; Life, F(1, 79) 5
50.97, p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5 27.64–49.39;
Property, F(1, 78) 5 73.92, p , .001, BCa 95% CI
5 44.57–71.16; Law, F(1, 74) 5 165.65, p , .001,
BCa 95% CI 5 70.97 to 96.29; Legal Justice, F(1,
79) 5 207.25, p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5 59.12–
77.39; and total SRM-SF, F(1, 79) 5 207.91, p ,
.001, BCa 95% CI 5 45.18–59.66, Scores. In
contrast, there were no significant differences (p.
.05) between offenders and nonoffenders across
all seven constructs and Total Score. There was a
significant interaction between intellectual dis-
abilities and offense regarding Contract, F(1, 79)
5 14.95, p , 0.001, BCa 95% CI 5 226.27 to
28.85; Truth, F(1, 77) 5 8.77, p 5 .003, BCa 95%
CI 5 230.60 to 26.66; Affiliation, F(1, 79) 5
6.15, p 5 .014, BCa 95% CI 5 225.09 to 22.89;
Life, F(1, 79) 5 13.79, p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5
230.91 to 29.31; Property, F(1, 78) 5 17.41, p ,
.001, BCa 95% CI 5 241.52 to 214.69; Law, F(1,
74) 5 22.88, p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5 243.76 to
218.65; Legal Justice, F(1, 79) 5 29.11, p , .001,
BCa 95% CI 5 234.97 to 216.58; and Total
SRM-SF Scores, F(1, 79) 5 31.03, p , .001, BCa
95% CI 5 227.49 to 213.01 (Table 5).
Post hoc testing revealed that the intellectual
disabilities group scored significantly (p , .05)
lower than the intellectual disabilities–offender
group on Contract, Life, Property, Law, Legal
Justice, and Total SRM-SF Scores. However, the
difference between the intellectual disabilities
group and the intellectual disabilities–offender
group on Truth (p 5 .22, BCa 95% CI 5 256.41–
14.62, and Affiliation (p 5 .215, BCa 95% CI 5
249.84–10.37) was not statistically significant.
The intellectual disabilities group scored at the
Transition Stage 1(2) on Property, Stage 1 on Law,
and at the Transition Stage 2(1) on Legal Justice,
whereas the intellectual disabilities–offender
group scored at Stage 2 across these constructs.
The intellectual disabilities group also scored
significantly (p , .05) lower than the compari-
son-offenders and comparison groups on all seven
constructs and the Total SRM-SF Score (Table 5).
The intellectual disabilities–offender group
scored significantly (p , .05) lower than the
comparison-offenders and comparison groups
across all seven constructs and the Total SRM-SF
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Score. The intellectual disabilities–offender group
scored consistently at Stage 2 across constructs,
whereas the comparison-offenders group scored at
Stage 2 on Property only (scoring at Stage 3 across
the other constructs). However, the comparison-
offenders group scored significantly (p, .05) lower
than the comparison group across all seven
constructs and the Total SRM-SF Score (Table 5).
The comparison group scored consistently at Stage
3 across all constructs. Examining the differences
between the four groups with respect to total SRM-
SF score indicated that the differences took the
shape of a significant linear trend (p , .001).
Moral Reasoning: Controlling for
Intellectual Functioning
Because there was a positive relationship
between intellectual functioning and moral rea-
soning, with intellectual functioning accounting
for 74% of the variability in total moral reasoning
score (R2 5 .74; b 5 0.86; B 5 2.80; t 5 14.99,
p , .001, BCa 95% CI 5 2.37–3.23), the previous
analysis was repeated, controlling for scores on
the WAIS- IIIU.K.. There was no longer a
significant main effect for intellectual disabilities
regarding Contract, F(1, 79)5 3.35, p5 .083, BCa
95% CI 5 24.64–42.96; Affiliation, F(1, 79) 5
4.89, p 5 .079, BCa 95% CI 5 22.55–66.27; Life,
F(1, 79) 5 2.61, p 5 0.232, BCa 95% CI 5
210.10–56.51; Property, F(1, 78) # 1.00, p 5 .42,
BCa 95% CI 5 223.31–51.96; or Law, F(1, 74) 5
1.04, p 5 0.316, BCa 95% CI 5 216.71–55.94.
The absence of a significant main effect for
offense remained, however, with the exception
of moral reasoning regarding the law, where
offenders scored higher than nonoffenders, F(1,
79) 5 3.30, p 5 .05, BCa 95% CI 5 0.75–21.20.
The significant interactions among factors re-
mained but not in relation to Contract, F(1, 79)5
4.06, p 5 .079, BCa 95% CI 5 221.02–2.25;
Truth, F(1, 77) 5 3.57, p 5 .110, BCa 95% CI 5
226.07–3.13; Affiliation, F(1, 79) 5 3.22, p 5
.177, BCa 95% CI 5 229.64–6.96; or Life, F(1,
79)5 6.52, p5 .06, BCa 95% CI5234.15–3.14).
Post hoc analyses indicated that, when Full-
Scale IQ was controlled, the intellectual disabil-
ities group was no longer significantly different
from the intellectual disabilities–offender group
on Contract (p 5 .157, BCa 95% CI 5 243.10–
6.61), Truth (p 5 .371, BCa 95% CI 5 250.69–
20.16), or Affiliation (p 5 .284, BCa 95% CI 5
254.19–15.98). The intellectual disabilities group
was not significantly different from the compar-
ison-offenders group on Contract (p 5 .093; BCa
95% CI 5 288.19–10.42), Affiliation (p 5 .068,
BCa 95% CI 5 2131.17–9.55), Life (p 5 .136,
BCa 95% CI 5 2124.10–17.29), Property (p 5
.170, BCa 95% CI52114.91–20.33), or Law (p5
.160, BCa 95% CI 5 2130.82–12.48). There was
no significant difference between the intellectual
disabilities group and the comparison group on
Contract (p 5 .070, BCa 95% CI 5 2125.42–
11.53), Affiliation (p 5 .081, BCa 95% CI 5
2191.83–20.67), Life (p 5 .139, BCa 95% CI 5
2183.04–30.97), Property (p 5 .155, BCa 95% CI
52152.68–22.60), or Law (p5 .167, BCa 95% CI
5 2143.49–15.64; Figure 1). However, the intel-
lectual disabilities group remained significantly
different (p , .05) from all other groups on Legal
Justice and the Total SRM-SF Score.
When Full-Scale IQ was controlled, the scores
of the intellectual disabilities–offender group were
not significantly different from those of the
comparison-offenders group on Contract (p 5
.241, BCa 95% CI 5 259.76–19.38), Truth (p 5
.105, BCa 95% CI 5 2109.43–15.28), Affiliation
(p 5 .123, BCa 95% CI 5 297.28–13.43), Life
(p 5 .613, BCa 95% CI 5 273.62–38.46),
Property (p 5 .869, BCa 95% CI 5 254.46–
65.14), Law (p 5 .952, BCa 95% CI 5 274.36–
58.45) or total SRM-SF scores (p 5 .128, BCa 95%
CI 5 256.72–7.06; Figure 1). The intellectual
disabilities–offender group also did not differ
significantly from the comparison group on
Contract (p 5 .132, BCa 95% CI 5 297.59–
19.94), Affiliation (p 5 .124, BCa 95% CI 5
2158.81–28.88), Life (p 5 .393, BCa 95% CI 5
2132.73–51.04), Property (p 5 .834, BCa 95% CI
5 292.20–66.54), Law (p 5 .821, BCa 95% CI 5
287.07–61.79), or the Total SRM-SF Score (p 5
.064, BCa 95% CI 5 299.06–4.88; see Figure 1).
However, the intellectual disabilities–offender
group remained significantly different (p , .05)
from all other groups on Legal Justice.
When Full-Scale IQ was controlled, the
comparison-offenders group was not significantly
different from the comparison group on Contract
(p5 .202, BCa 95% CI5253.88 to 14.76), Truth
(p 5 0.137, BCa 95% CI 5 270.19–12.05),
Affiliation (p 5 .273, BCa 95% CI 5 282.94–
27.49), Life (p 5 .303, BCa 95% CI 5 278.40–
27.01), Property (p 5 .535, BCa 95% CI 5
259.50–27.67), Law (p 5 .726, BCa 95% CI 5
244.88–30.42), or Total SRM-SF Score (p 5 .130,
BCa 95% CI 5 252.96–10.35; Figure 1). The
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differences among the four groups on the Total
SRM-SF Score took the shape of a significant
linear trend (p 5 .002). Both the comparison-
offenders group and the comparison group were
significantly different (p , .05) from all other
groups on Legal Justice. These results indicate
that, with the exception of Legal Justice, some of
the differences among the four groups could be
accounted for by differences in intellectual
functioning.
Mediation
Initially, correlations (two-tailed) among mor-
al reasoning (SRM-SF Total Score), cognition
distortions (HIT Scale), and empathy (BEI) were
examined. There was a significant positive rela-
tionship between moral reasoning and empathy,
r(80) 5 .33, p 5 .002), and significant negative
relationships between moral reasoning and cog-
nitive distortions, r(80) 5 2.43, p , .001, and
empathy and cognitive distortions, r(80) 5 2.25,
p 5 .025).
When we investigated the relationships
among moral reasoning, cognitive distortions,
and empathy, we found that empathy significant-
ly predicted both cognitive distortions (p5 .0249)
and moral reasoning (p 5 .0024). Moral reasoning
also significantly predicted cognitive distortions,
controlling for empathy (p 5 .0007). The indirect
effect was significant (z 5 22.37, p 5 .0177), and
this was confirmed by the results using the
bootstrapping method (95% BCa CI 5 20.0601
to 20.0092; Figure 2).
Discussion
The results of the current study demonstrated
that the moral reasoning of the intellectual
disabilities–offender group was more mature than
that of the intellectual disabilities group. The
moral reasoning of the comparison-offender
group was more developed than that of the
intellectual disabilities–offender group but less
mature than that of the comparison group. The
global moral reasoning scores across these four
groups approximated a linear trend, even when
intelligence had been controlled. Nevertheless,
both groups of men with intellectual disabilities
were reasoning at global Stage 2, whereas both
groups of men without intellectual disabilities
were reasoning at global Stage 3.
The analysis suggested that there was no
significant difference in emotional empathy
between the two groups of men with intellec-
tual disabilities, but the intellectual disabili-
ties group had more limited empathy than the
Figure 1. Adjusted Means (SEM) on the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure—Short Form (Gibbs,
Basinger, & Fuller, 1992), controlling for Full-Scale IQ by group. ID 5 intellectual disabilities.
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comparison-offender group. The intellectual dis-
abilities–offender group had more limited empa-
thy than either of the groups of men without
intellectual disabilities. These results contrasted
with those of Proctor and Beail (2007), who
suggested that offenders with intellectual disabil-
ities have better empathy and theory-of-mind
skills than nonoffenders. However, Woodbury-
Smith et al. (2005) reported findings similar to
those of the current study. They found there was
no difference in the scores of offenders and
nonoffenders with high-functioning autistic spec-
trum conditions on theory-of-mind and emotion-
al recognition tasks. They did, however, report
that performance on these tasks, together with
more limited intellectual ability, was associated
with an increased likelihood of being in their
offender group. It is important to note, however,
that the current study focused on men with
intellectual disabilities, rather than men and
women with high-functioning autism.
Turning to cognitive distortions, men with
intellectual disabilities scored higher on the
measure of distorted cognitions than those
without intellectual disabilities, and offenders
scored higher than nonoffenders, with distorted
cognitions being highest among offenders with
intellectual disabilities. The findings are consis-
tent with those from studies involving sexual
offenders with intellectual disabilities (Broxholme
& Lindsay, 2003; Langdon, Maxted, Murphy, &
SOTSEC-ID, 2007; Langdon & Talbot, 2006;
Lindsay & Michie, 2004; Lindsay et al., 2006;
Lindsay, Whitefield, & Carson, 2007; Murphy,
Powell, Guzman, & Hays, 2007; Talbot &
Langdon, 2006). However, ours is the first study
we know of in which the likelihood of endorsing
cognitive distortions has been investigated in men
with intellectual disabilities who have been
convicted of other offenses.
Turning to our hypothesis, which predicted
that the intellectual disabilities group would score
lower on the measure of moral reasoning than the
intellectual disabilities–offender group and the
comparison-offender group would score lower
than the comparison group, the results indicated
that the differences between the groups were as
predicted. After controlling for intelligence in the
analysis, results indicated that the total moral
reasoning score of the intellectual disabilities–
offender group was no longer significantly differ-
ent from the comparison-offenders group and the
comparison-offenders group was no longer signif-
icantly different from the comparison group. This
suggests that some of the differences between the
groups can be accounted for by intelligence.
Langdon, Murphy, et al. (2010) also demonstrated
that many of the differences between men with
and without intellectual disabilities, with no
known history of arrests, cautions, or convictions,
could be accounted for by intelligence. In their
study, intelligence accounted for all the differences
between the two groups with the exception of
moral reasoning in relation to the law and overall
SRM-SF score. Nevertheless, even when IQ was
controlled, the four groups differed significantly on
Legal Justice. This finding may be related to the
finding that there is intergenerational transmission
of offending in men (Farrington, Coid, & Murray,
2009) and requires more detailed examination.
In this study, we found that the moral
reasoning of both groups of men with intellectual
disabilities fell at Stage 2 overall, yet one group
had a documented history of criminal offending,
Figure 2. A mediation analysis demonstrating that the relationship between empathy and distorted
cognitions is mediated by moral reasoning. Using bootstrapping, a significant indirect effect is found.
BC 5 bias-corrected confidence interval.
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whereas the other had no history of criminal
offending. This finding may be accounted for by
the differences between the groups across the
seven constructs measured by the SRM-SF.
Specifically, the intellectual disabilities group
demonstrated less mature reasoning in relation
to Property, Law, and Legal Justice factors. This
finding is consistent with that of Langdon,
Murphy, et al. (2010). It suggests moral judgment
within these areas is based on the avoidance of
punishment and unilateral authority. As expected
from the literature relating to young offenders
(Blasi, 1980; Campagna & Harter, 1975; Chandler
& Moran, 1990; Gavaghan, Arnold, & Gibbs,
1983; Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; Nelson
et al., 1990; Trevethan & Walker, 1989), the
intellectual disabilities–offender group demon-
strated reasoning at Stage 2 in relation to these
three constructs,. In contrast, the comparison-
offenders group demonstrated Stage 2 moral
reasoning only on Property, scoring at Stage 3
across the other constructs, whereas the compar-
ison group scored at Stage 3 across all the
constructs.
Our findings in relation to offenders without
intellectual disabilities were not entirely consis-
tent with the moral reasoning literature relating to
young offenders. Gibbs (2003) commented that
many studies have demonstrated that young
offenders tend to make more use of Stage 2
moral reasoning with regards to concepts such as
legal justice and the law (Blasi, 1980; Campagna
& Harter, 1975; Chandler & Moran, 1990;
Gavaghan et al., 1983; Gregg et al., 1994; Nelson
et al., 1990; Trevethan & Walker, 1989). In
contrast, young people who are not offenders
tend to give Stage 3 reasons for obeying the law
(Gibbs, 2003, 2010). Although the comparison-
offenders group in our study had significantly
lower scores on the test of moral reasoning than
the comparison group, our findings were not
consistent with this literature, because on average,
the comparison-offenders group was reasoning at
Stage 3. It is important to note, though, that our
offenders were adults rather than young offenders.
Such findings are consistent with Stevenson et al.
(2003), who also found that adult offenders tend
to be reasoning at Stage 3.
In relation to men with intellectual disabilities
who are offenders, however, our findings were
consistent with the literature relating to young
offenders. The intellectual disabilities–offender
group was consistently reasoning at Stage 2 across
all constructs. Furthermore, the findings suggested
that nonoffenders with intellectual disabilities
were reasoning at Stage 1 and, therefore, appealing
to unilateral authority and avoidance of punish-
ment when making moral judgments in relation
to the law. This may explain why, as a group, they
had no history of arrests, cautions, or convictions,
considering that their total moral reasoning score
fell at Stage 2.
Our findings have substantial clinical impli-
cations for men with intellectual disabilities.
Langdon et al. (2011) pointed out that the
relationship between moral development and
social perspective–taking provides a rationale for
the effectiveness of group-based interventions
over individual treatments, because groups offer
more opportunities for social perspective–taking.
Gibbs and his colleagues (Gibbs, 2003, 2010;
Gibbs et al., 1995) argued that proximal, as well as
distal, interventions are required when offering
clinical interventions to young offenders on the
grounds that moral reasoning abilities are distal
schema within the context of a social situation.
Cognitive distortions and social skills, which are
proximal, also need to be targeted to ensure that
interventions are effective. In an attempt to
address this issue, Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs,
Potter, Barriga, & Liau, 1996; Gibbs et al., 1995;
Potter, Gibbs, & Goldstein, 2001) developed the
Equipping Youth to Help One Another Pro-
gramme (EQUIP), which has been shown to be
effective at reducing misconduct and recidivism
rates (Leeman, Gibbs, & Fuller, 1993).
Given the evidence that the moral reasoning
abilities of offenders with intellectual disabilities
are comparable with those of young offenders, the
question of whether or not the EQUIP pro-
gramme is likely to be an effective treatment for
this population requires investigation. In view of
the strong relationship between intelligence and
moral development, Langdon, Clare, et al. (2010)
considered whether people with intellectual dis-
abilities would be able to reach the developmen-
tally more mature moral reasoning stages that are
protective against illegal behavior. The findings
from the current study indicate that men with
intellectual disabilities with no history of illegal
behavior are reasoning at Stage 1 in relation to
Property, Law, and Legal Justice factors, whereas
offenders with intellectual disabilities are reason-
ing at Stage 2. Therefore, an alternative therapeu-
tic approach may be to encourage moral reason-
ing that appeals to unilateral authority and
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avoidance of punishment. It would, however,
make sense to examine whether EQUIP can bring
about developmental shifts to mature moral
reasoning among offenders with intellectual
disabilities before endorsing such a strategy.
Our findings suggest that the relationship
between empathy and distorted cognitions is
mediated by moral reasoning. This was investi-
gated because both Gibbs (2003, 2010) and
Hoffman (2000) have argued that cognition serves
to augment empathic states. Hoffman argued that
empathy is the primary motivator of moral
behavior and is affected by moral reasoning,
whereas Gibbs argued that moral reasoning and
empathy are motivators of moral behavior, with
empathy influenced by distorted cognitions,
arising from maladaptive moral schema. The
findings from our study indicate that the rela-
tionship between empathy and distorted cogni-
tions is mediated by moral reasoning. From a
theoretical perspective, this makes sense, because
distorted cognitions reflect moral schema, and,
therefore, the relationship between empathy and
distorted cognitions would occur through moral
reasoning. Although the findings of our media-
tion analysis are consistent with Hoffman (2000)
and Gibbs (2003, 2010), because of the emphasis
that each researcher placed on empathy, the
analysis is not a test of whether empathy alone
or empathy and moral principles motivate moral
behavior; additional research is needed.
There are some limitations with the current
study that need to be highlighted. Because some
of the participants were in custodial facilities, it is
likely that they received some sort of intervention
for their offending behavior. This may have
affected their moral reasoning. It was impossible
to control for this in the analysis, because of such
marked variability in the programs available in
prisons and hospitals and, moreover, in what is
offered to offenders with different index offenses.
It is also the case that offenders who volunteered
to take part in this study may have different moral
reasoning and empathy abilities than those who
did not volunteer. It is also important to mention
that IQs of men with intellectual disabilities
included within this study were necessarily
restricted. Last, the internal consistency of the
empathy measure used within this study is
problematic, and some additional work is needed
regarding the development of measures of empa-
thy for offenders with intellectual and other
developmental disabilities.
In conclusion, the results indicated that the
moral reasoning abilities of offenders with intel-
lectual disabilities are developmentally delayed
and that the relationship between empathy and
distorted cognitions is mediated by moral reason-
ing. Future research should focus on whether
clinical interventions for offenders with intellec-
tual disabilities, based on moral development
theory, are effective.
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